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I - Introduction 1
This working paper is the result of the coordinated effort of a group of
researchers and experts in European integration and monetary and financial
affairs, who were chosen in a way as to represent the entire spectrum of the
countries members of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Most of them have
an academic background and work as researchers and professors in centers of
research and universities. These are the University of Vienna, the Université
libre de Bruxelles, the Université de Paris X Nanterre, the Observatoire français
des conjonctures économiques and the Institut d’Etudes Politiques, the Robert
Schuman chair in political science at the University of Cologne, the Greek
EKEME (Greek Center of European Studies and Research), the LUISS, at
Rome and the IAI (Istituto di Affari Internazionali), the IEEI (Instituto de
Estudios Estrategicos e Internacionais) of Lisbonne, the Universidad
Complutense de Madrid and Universidad de Granada, the Federal Trust of
London and the Stockholm School of Economics. However, the attachment to a
research institution was not considered as an essential criterion for being part of
the network. As a matter of fact, also representatives of national central banks
are part of the team, such as the National Bank of Belgium and, hopefully, in the
next future, also the Central Bank of Luxembourg.
Most of these centres are members of the Trans European Policy Studies
Association (TEPSA), a network linking institutes of research located in the 15
countries of the European Union, with other associated institutions, such as the
College of Europe and the European University Institute, and other centers in
Eastern Europe. The main feature of these institutions is that their researchers
are experts who deal with European and International subjects, using essentially
an interdisciplinary approach.
                                                          
1  This report has been written by Jean-Victor Louis and Stefania Baroncelli.
The authors of the reports (so called “rapporteurs”) have been co-ordinated by a
Screening Committee located at the European University Institute of Florence
and composed of the Professors, Michael Artis, Ramon Marimon, Yves Meny,
Natalino Ronzitti, Wolfgang Wessels and  Jacques Ziller. Responsible for the
Project are Jean-Victor Louis, Director of the project, and Stefania Baroncelli,
Research Assistant (up to the end of December 1999, Julio Baquero Cruz). The
project is carried out within the European University Institute, at Florence,  and
especially its Law Department and the Robert Schuman Center.
The network reflects the approach used for the study, which is inter-disciplinary
and trans-european in nature, with a special focus on political, legal and
economic aspects. The euro has now been born and has become the single
currency of  the eleven countries members of the European Monetary Union. It
is the main purpose of the study to look at the way financial institutions, public
administrations and the public at large adjust themselves to the new situation
and how they perceive this change, up to the introduction of monetary signs
denomibnated in euro. Not to speak about the status of “out countries”, such as
UK, Sweden, Greece and Denmark, where the perception of EMU remains
crucial for understanding future developments.
The number of publications on this field is enormous; however, in most cases
either they give only a mere “piece of information” or they limit themselves to a
special part of the problem and are too specific to be useful to policy-makers of
national or international instances who are interested in having a more global
answer to the functioning and evolution of the EMU. This is the reason why we
decided to build a stable team of experts and to create a flexible and long-term
(4-year) project of research aimed at registering the evolution of the EMU in the
Member States using various instruments, such as opinion polls, interviews to
members of relevant financial and representative institutions and social actors,
political and party programs, media analysis, pieces of legislation and
regulations, economic indicators and forecasts. And we called it, not
surprisingly, “Euro Spectator”. Also, we decided not to limit ourselves to the
study of “in” countries but to adopt a wider vision enshrining all the member
States of the European Union.
This choice was made because we intended to give to our study also a practical
approach so as to serve as a good point of reference for all those institutional
actors responsible for monetary and financial policy, mostly at international and
European level, interested in having a deeper view of the introduction of the
euro in the countries of the Union. In summary, we decided not to limit our
research to a mere piece of information, but to consider it as an instrument so as
to vehiculate the core of an important message to policy-makers.
The reports witness an interesting reality: the panorama in the EU countries,
though different in nature, is characterised by similar problems, such as the lack
of information vis-à-vis citizens, difficulty in having expert knowledge from
official sources, lack of “non superficial” information, non comparable opinion
polls. Other questions, on the other hand, remain linked to a specific State or
area, such as differences in drafting national regulation notwithstanding the
wording of Community legislation, problems regarding the federal or unitary
form of State, the division in “in” and “out” countries.
The reports of the Euro Spectator are ten in number and describe the
correspondent situation in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. The situation in Denmark, Finland, Ireland,
The Netherlands and Luxembourg are not analysed here; this is not a conceptual
choice, but a mere logistic and temporary one. In the next future, we envisage to
expand our analysis to these countries as well.
As already mentioned, the reports are divided into three sections, each dealing
with political, legal and economic questions. While the part on the political
aspects is aimed at having a clear view of the state of public opinion, and
includes the evaluation of recent opinion polls, the positions of governmental
and parliamentary positions, the policy statements of political parties and social
partners with a special focus on the measures introduced by the European
Central Bank, the part on the legal framework is more limited in scope, dealing
with the national legislation related to the euro and EMU. This second part is
more defined because the main legislative structure has already been established
at Community level; however, this does not mean that it is uncontroversial per
se, as some rapporteurs have raised some interesting questionable points. The
last part is devoted to the economic situation, in particular to trends towards spill
over vis-à-vis  taxation, social policy, coordination of macroeconomic policy
and monetary policy (policy mix) and external projections of the euro.
II. Some lessons from the first set of Euro Spectator reports
The rapporteurs were invited to comment on the state of the opinion in their
respective Country towards the euro. In order to measure it, they had at their
disposal the opinion polls conducted  on a Community basis, like the
Eurobarometer and, in some but not in all Countries, national polls organised
from time to time by some specialised agencies for the account of media or
political organisations. Such polls are reliable if the questions asked are
sufficiently precise and analysis on a long period are possible if there is some
stability in the kind of questions asked. In some Countries, the questionnaires
are more sophisticated than in others and permit for a detailed approach of the
way of thinking of the various sectors of the population ( like in France)
considering the sex, the age, the level of income, the education, the kind of
profession, etc… In other Countries, there are no relevant polls of the opinion,
except for the Eurobarometer and the special edition of Europinion on
“European Public Opinion on the Single Currency” published in January 1999.
These situation limits the possibility of scientific comparisons between the
different States. Anyway, it has been underlined at the Brussels seminar, that
one needs an overview on the last ten years in order to be able  to understand the
changes in political opinion.
Nevertheless, one can draw from the reports the following basic trends.
First, the opinion on the euro is generally on line with the attitude on the
European Union as such. The degree of awareness of the importance of the
reality of European integration and of the meaning of the creation of the
monetary union  vary from one Member State to another. For example, Spain
appears as the Country where there are the biggest rates of “No answer”. If some
enthusiasm has been observed more or less everywhere at the time of the
changeover in the Participating countries, it has neither been very big nor very
sustained. As one can read in the Spanish report, “el euro no se celebra ni se
critica” (“One does neither  celebrate, nor criticise the euro”). The more
dramatic change in the public opinion on the euro has been observed in
Germany where from December 1998 to January 1999, the majority against the
euro has been changed into a majority in favour. If the public opinion on the
euro cannot be separated from their  general perception of the EU, it is also
volatile and could be reversible with the conjuncture.
Second, some disappointment is noticeable in the evolution of the rather good
disposition of the public concerning the euro. Although the reports give no
definitive explanation on a move that is not very important in quantitative terms,
one can suggest the following explanations. The discussions on the relations
between the ECB and Governments, animated by Oskar Lafontaine plea for a
lowering of interest rate, the general political situation (Kosowo), the absence of
Europe on the international political scene, the weakness of the euro on the
Exchange markets, and especially its rate versus the US Dollar, the fears
concerning the Year 2000 bug, have more impressed the opinion than the
success of the euro in the obligations market, and the positive evolution of the
economic cycle in Europe. For many, the absence of monetary signs in euro has
negatively work on the reception and perception of the radical monetary change
which has occurred the 1st of January 1999. Three years of transition before the
concretisation of the new currency in coins and notes was too big a period. One
has probably overestimated the importance of scriptural and virtual money in the
minds of the citizen.
Third, the discussion on the euro and the EMU, in general, is more lively in the
Out Countries than in the Participating ones. It is the case in all the Outs, no
matter their specific status towards the euro, but with some specificity. In the
UK, the debate has been more on the economic pros and cons of the
participation. The truly political debate is bypassed by this restrictive vision of
the consequences of the changeover. The “sovereignty debate is transformed in
an economic one”. In Greece, although “an acrimonious public debate” has been
noticed on  the interest rate decisions, and on the consequences of the Stability
Pact, Year 2000 was expected to be more “discussion intensive”. In Sweden, the
debate seems, like in the UK, to remain purely economic and limited to experts.
The proximity of the referendum in Denmark should increase the interest of the
opinion for the euro. By contrast, political parties in the Ins seem to have a very
limited interest in the euro, and that is the case in every participating Country.
The euro could nevertheless be an argument in elections campaigns, when the
Governing party can attribute itself the merit of having led its Country towards
the euro. It has been the case in Spain for the Popular Party and the euro has
been central in the electoral campaign of the Pasok in what was at the time a not
yet participating Country like Greece.
It is to be expected that the active interest rate policy of the ECB will animate
the still rather sleeping concern of the Trade Unions and Left parties against
high interest rates and the fight against the inflation as the quasi unique motor of
the action of the ECB.
As far as the reactions of the credit institutions is concerned, one could notice
some criticism against the lowering of interest rates in April 1999, and observe
that the decision in the other direction in November 1999 was largely expected
by the Market, demonstrating perhaps an improvement in the quality of the
communication policy of the ECB. No doubt that the acceleration of the
volatility of interest rate will provoke diverse kinds of reaction, depending on
the State concerned. It will be important to follow these reactions in the next
report and that could only be done through a collaboration of economists and
political scientists.
The legal parts of the reports describe the legislative measures that have been
taken in order to comply with the requirements of the Treaty and of the euro
legislation.
Article 109 (ex article 108) and Article 121.1 (ex article 109J.1) provide for the
necessity for the Member States to adapt their legislation on their Central Bank
to the requirement of independence, to make this legislation and other legal texts
compatible with the integration of their NCB in the ESCB, and more generally
to the participation to the third stage of the EMU. These obligations relate to the
so-called “legal convergence”, necessary alongside the respect of economic
criteria for the participation of a country to the Monetary union.
To make their Central bank independent represented for the Member States,
except for Germany, a kind of cultural revolution. For the beginning of the
second stage, they had already to exclude the monetary financing of the Public
sector by the Central bank, and some of the Countries concerned have
anticipated at this occasion on the realisation of the independence (Belgium,
France and Spain, essentially) but in 1998, a step further was to be accomplished
in order to make clear in the legal texts that, from the beginning of the third
stage,  the so-called “monetary sovereignty” was no more in the hands neither of
the State nor of its Central bank.
The only Country that did not comply with the requirement of “legal
convergence” was Sweden and this infringement to  the obligations of the Treaty
was with the absence of any exchange rate objective, the reason for the negative
conclusion of the reports of the Commission and the EMI, in March 1998,
concerning this Country, that decided, on its own, to avoid to create the
conditions of its participation to the third stage of EMU. As observed in the
report for Sweden, the attitude of this Country and the absence of legal reaction
of the Community at this respect are a very bad example for the present
applicant Countries to which it is asked, under the so-called “Copenhagen
criteria”, to adhere in full to the acquis communautaire. No opt out will be
conceded. But is it well necessary if it is up to a Country to organise its inability
to participate?
The adaptation to the euro includes less political symbolism. It is an important
but limited and technical operation. On the principles, things are clearly laid
down by the euro regulations, that are directly applicable. The regime for the
transition, dominated by the substitution of the euro for the national currencies,
remaining only non-decimal denominations of the euro, the principles of “No
prohibition and no compulsion” in the use of the euro, the limited exceptions
providing some role for the euro as banking money, before the issuance of
monetary signs denominated in euro, did not need for national complements. It
was also the case for the famous provision on the continuity of contracts that
caused so much trouble in some quarters and do not seem to create problems in
the practice. More technical questions required national implementation
measures, like the faculty of redenomination of debts, the provisions on
rounding, and the use of reference rates (like the PIBOR, LIBOR, MIBOR, etc)
after the disappearance of the national currencies. Public administrations had
also some freedom in the adoption of measures in order to allow the use of the
euro in fiscal  declarations and in other kind of relations with the citizens. This
all range of measures have been mentioned in the reports concerning the
participating countries.
What just  been recalled explain why the legal part of the present reports appear
as one shot operations. Some general lessons can been drawn from this
operation without precedent concerning the adaptation of the statutes of national
central banks for their integration in the ESCB.
The operation consisting in the transformation of the statutes of a national
institution (and what is more “national” than a national central bank?) under a
Community obligation and with the close intervention of a Community agency
(the EMI) is indeed an intrusion by Community law and institutions in the field
of the so-called “institutional autonomy” of the Member States, i.e.  the right to
design under their responsibility the institutional set up for the implementation
of Community law. It reveals the special nature of the ESCB, that includes in a
same context, a Community agency and national institutions: the ECB and
NCBs. Never before the “communitisation” of national authorities has been
pushed so far and the famous “dédoublement fonctionnel”, where national
institutions are at the same time national organs and agents of Community law,
so clearly organised. It has been for the EMI to provide the criteria for the
independence of NCBs and their integration into the System and it is the EMI
which has supervised the way the draft legislation has been conceived in order
to comply with the Community requirements. The EMI has not only an official
duty to supervise this process but also a precise consultative function on these
drafts and, in  parallel with  the Commission, a reporting obligation on the
achievement of legal convergence.
That does mean that the statutes of the NCBs have been harmonised to the point
of reaching a complete homogeneity. The Community had no such power.
Directives for that result have not been foreseen. The NCBs have to comply with
the requirements of the Treaty in the field of application of the ESCB.
Theoretically, a dual structure could have been imagined : one for the
participation to the ESCB missions and another for the execution of the tasks
remaining under national law. Such a system would have been too heavy, but
some organs of the NCBs could be exclusively charged with non ESCB
functions. On the other hand, the structure of the Central Bank is dictated by
traditions and the national context. Some provide for consultative organs where
social partners can dialogue with the decision-making organs of the Bank (like
in Belgium, for ex.). Specific missions can include the existence of a particular
kind of  control by the State. No authorisation is required for a NCB to engage,
at the request of the Government, in such or such activity, outside the System. If
there is an interference with the implementation of the missions pertaining to the
ESCB, the Governing Council may intervene under Article 14.4 of the ESCB
Statute.
In general, national laws have been made compatible with  the Community
requirements and where a provision seems to be inappropriate, it appears to be
without any real meaning. It is the case of the articles providing that the
monetary policy has to support the general economic policy of the Government
(Banque de France and Bundesbank), in the framework of the respect for price
stability. As there is no national monetary policy anymore, such provisions, only
included for political reasons are meaningless.
The transformation of NCBs as agents of the System has provoked a reflection
on the internal structure of these institutions. The German report describes the
present debate in this Country, concerning a possible “centralisation” of the
Bundesbank. The role of the Landeszentralbanken could be substantially
modified and that would imply a transformation of the respective role of the two
main organs of the Bank. In other Countries as well, but in a less dramatic way,
some reforms have been introduced or contemplated as far as the network of
branches is concerned. These networks have already become obsolete through
the evolution of the payment systems caused by the development of the
instruments of payment. The “Europeanisation” has accelerated an irremediable
adaptation to new circumstances.
NCBs, having lost their power on monetary policy, are sometimes eager to
preserve their functions in other fields, when a tentative is made either at
European or at national level, to change the institutional set up. It has been the
case for the management of public debt that wished to transfer to a European
private agency. A similar reaction could well be observed if similar attempts
would be made in order to centralise some tasks in the field of banking
supervision.
The Spanish rapporteur mentioned that the legislation on the euro has
systematically repeated the provisions of the euro regulations for the sake of
legal certainty. It has also, and that is more objectionable, added to some
provisions, like the one on continuity of contracts, by expressly excluding any
kind of access to a Court in that matter.
With the adoption of the legal measures analysed by the rapporteurs, the
essential part of the adaptation of the “public”  legal framework to the third
stage of EMU has been completed. Nevertheless, other measures will have to be
adopted in order to realise a perfect unification of the financial markets. The
Commission has presented  a “Financial Market Action Plan” that has been
endorsed by the Cologne European Council in June 1999. This agenda of
harmonisation of private law (on cross border use of collateral, or the
infrastructure of securities settlement systems, for ex.) is  of such a specialised
nature that it is not possible to include it in the national reports as they are
presently conceived  and one could think in organising  a separate exercise (like
a seminar) on that topic.
The economic part of the reports bear on possible spill over of the monetary
union on other policies, making of it the “central engine” for integration, as the
German report puts it. Up to now, such effect has not been noticeable. Every
report mentions a possible effect on tax harmonisation but, the failure of the
Helsinki European Council on that matter is there to demonstrate that the
obstacles are still considerable.
The French report, observing the “euphoria” caused by the positive turn over of
the conjuncture, concludes that the debate on the necessity of an increased co-
ordination of economic policies has lost momentum in a time when all
Governments are busy with the decision to be taken on the allocation of the
produce of growth. This may be qualified as short sight views because the
problems are there for the future. Remarkably enough, the debate on the so-
called “economic Government” has ceased soon after  the time of the start of the
third stage of monetary union. The unexpected departure from their respective
Government of first, Oskar Lafontaine and, some months after, Dominique
Strauss-Kahn has played a part in this lack of interest for a more active exercise
of responsibility by the political authorities in the co-ordination of economic
policies. The role of the Group Euro 11, an informal organ without any decision-
making power, has been accepted by everybody and the Intergovernmental
conference 2000 is not concerned with the question of strengthening the
economic pillar of the EMU. It is evident that one should  not expect a kind of
automatic development of the Community policies arising from the mere
existence of a monetary union.
Economists are concerned by the transparency and predictability of monetary
policy. That is also reflected in the reports, especially the UK and French ones.
In a intent to rationalise the concepts, Tommaso Padoa-Schiopppa, a Member of
the Executive Board of the ECB,  has proposed to distinguish more carefully
between notions that “interrelate and even overlap” but that cannot be  used
interchangeably (see “An institutional glossary of the Eurosystem”, report at a
Conference on “The Constitution of the Eurosystem: the Views of the EP and
the ECB”, 8 March 2000): independence, accountability, transparency and
predictability.
In particular, according to this author, accountability is intended to express a
political duty, based of a need for democratic control over the exercise of power,
implying the necessity to “justify and explain actions and decisions” (p. 5 and
7). Transparency is viewed as the communication of policy decisions in real
time, or even the making of its intentions known beforehand (p.7). Transparency
could be conceived as an economic requirement. Predictability implies the
precise estimation of future decisions to be taken in the future (p.10). Padoa-
Schioppa argues that, including for the most transparent Central Bank, such
predictability is not only impossible but also undesirable.
In the British and French debate, these concepts are clearly mixed up but the
clarification intended by Padoa-Schioppa, explains why  requests for more
transparency are present in the economic literature, as often as in political
discussions (like the ones in the European Parliament).  The request to have the
minutes of the ECB Governing Council published  focuses the attention, the
comparison being made with the publicity given to the minutes of the Monetary
Policy Committee of the Bank of England and of the Open Market Policy
Committee in the U.S. ( but nobody seems to notice that the minutes of the
Governing Board of the Federal Reserve are not published). The French report
makes a supplementary argument in favour of the publication of the minutes.
Without such a publication, one does know what is the way used for reaching a
consensus on the decisions concerning monetary policy, in a Eurosystem where
there is some diversity in the conjunctural evolutions. A decision taken at a
simple majority, as it is the rule under Article 10.2 of the ESCB Statute, could
be inappropriate for the bigger Countries and, hence, contrary to the interests of
the Eurosystem. This reasoning is based on the fact that Germany represents for
it alone, 33 % of the GIP of the whole and, that with France, one reaches 55 %,
and with Italy, 72 %. Without indications on the way decisions on interest rates
are  actually taken, one has no idea, so goes the argument, of the kind of
coalition-building that is at the basis of a concrete decision. This interrogation is
clearly inspired by the idea that Governors in the Governing Council are
“representing”, or at least, “defending the interests” of their Central bank. The
jurist knows that it is not the correct view. Under the Treaty and the Statute,
Governors participate to the meetings as independent experts working together
in the interest of the Eurosystem as a whole. Nevertheless, the view is  often
expressed, as noticed in the French report, that Monetary union works on the
basis of shared sovereignty (as opposed to transfer of sovereignty), that another
view is understandable and the sociologic weight of the status of the Governor at
the head of his NCB could lead to the inclination of defending national interests.
On the other hand, the members of the Governing Council are becoming more
and more aware that their (joint) responsibility has grown in importance and that
they have to take into account the situation of the Eurosystem as a whole.
Research Departments of the NCBs have been developed. Their field of
investigation has indeed dramatically increased as they have to be able to check
the documents prepared by the ECB before the meetings  and inform their
governor on the situation of the System as a whole. Hence, the importance of a
counterbalancing  high level of expertise on the part of the ECB.
III. Perspective for  future reports
The first and foremost imperative for the Project is to extend to the 15 present
members of the EU, an ambition that is not impossible to fulfil.
Some orientations could be laid down for the reports expected for the beginning
of next year.
First of all, it will be necessary to refine the study of public opinion and to
follow the evolution of the public debate on the ECB and its policy. No doubt
that the increased activism of the Bank and the resulting volatility of the interest
rate will food this debate. The accession of Greece to the third stage of EMU
and the referendum in Denmark will certainly retain the attention.
The attitude of credit institutions should also be more closely looked at, with the
assistance of their professional associations and a careful reading of specialised
press. That could only be achieved through a collaboration of economists,
familiar with financial markets and political scientists, specialists of the study of
interest groups.
Possible national initiatives in the European framework should also be studied,
concerning the institutional set-up of Monetary union.
In the legal part of the reports, the Greek situation will necessarily call for a
special attention. The adaptation of NCBs structure should be analysed and the
possible national debate on that matter should be followed. The same could be
true for the evolution of minds and regulations concerning the prudential control
of credit institutions.
A subject that has been mentioned only in the Austrian report concerns the
internal application of the Stability Pact, especially in federal or quasi-federal
States, where decentralised entities benefit of fiscal autonomy under the
Constitution.
The completion of a European financial market and its regulation and control
could be treated in a separate seminar.
As far as economic studies are concerned, one can especially mention the role of
the euro in Candidate countries, in connection with the studies realised in the
framework of the “Enlargement Watch”, by the TEPSA network.
An additional element has been mentioned: a European report on the relations of
the ECB with Community institutions and bodies would be helpful. This should
include  an analysis of the participation of the ECB to the Macroeconomic
dialogue and its contacts with social partners.
This could pave the way for a seminar in March 2001, the year before the
issuance of monetary signs in euro.
As they are now, we are convinced that this first set of  reports, an experimental
endeavour in many respects, will be appreciated, for the richness of their
information and analysis, by all those interested in the building and
implementation of the EMU. We would indeed be happy to receive comments,
observations and information in order to improve our “product”.
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1. Political Aspects
by Helmut Lang
Until the summer of 1997 a significant majority of Austrians did not support the
single currency. That changed dramatically in the second half of 1997 with the
result that public opinion surveys from December 1997 onwards have shown a
stable net majority of Austrians supporting the euro. What had happened in the
second half of 1997? The Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs - FPÖ)
had organised a popular initiative in favour of a referendum on the euro, arguing
for a postponement of the third stage of EMU. At about the same time, the
federal government had started its information campaign in favour of the euro.
As a result, the euro and monetary union were debated intensely for the first
time in public. During this debate many Austrians probably realised for the first
time that Austria would change the schilling for the euro and obviously accepted
the arguments in favour of a single currency.
The most recent figures of a survey conducted on behalf of the euro information
centre of Austria's federal government in October 1999 showed that 63% of
Austrians had been in favour of the single currency and 36% against it.
                                                          
* Institute of Political Science - University of Vienna.
** University of Vienna.
Austria's political parties and the social partners support the euro. Generally
speaking, political players on the left side of the political spectrum (Social
Democratic Party, Green Party, Chamber of Labour and the Federation of
Austrian Trade Unions) emphasise the importance of economic growth and
employment as equally important to the primary objective of the European
System of Central Banks, that is price stability. They tend to criticise the
Stability and Growth Pact because it leaves too little room for manoeuvre in the
case of an economic downturn. The ECB should be more open to dialogue and
the monetary union should be complemented with a political and social union.
That means deregulation on the national level needs compensation on the
European level.
The political organisations on the right side of the political spectrum (Austrian
People's Party, Chamber of Commerce, Association of Austrian Industrialists)
are - again broadly speaking - satisfied with the monetary union as it is. They
stress the advantages of the single currency, such as the removal of currency
fluctuations and transaction costs. They also value the external pressure to
reduce the budget deficit and organise the public sector more efficiently.
A special case is the Freedom Party which until recently perceived the euro
highly critical. On entering the government, however, in February 2000, the
Freedom Party clearly committed itself to the monetary union in the working
programme of the government. However, several representatives of the Party,
including Party leader Jörg Haider, continue to send mixed signals.
In the public debate the euro did not play any significant role in 1999. The euro
was neither a topic in the election campaign before the elections to the European
Parliament in June nor before the general elections in Austria in October. The
decision of the ECB to reduce the interest rates in April 1999 was welcomed as
a positive signal. The raising of the interest rates in November was criticised by
many, especially the employee's associations.
2. Legal Framework
by Herta Baumann
The legislative adaptations in Austria are based on two principles: Firstly, each
federal ministry is responsible for the adjustment of the legislative provisions
within its sphere of competence; and secondly, each legislative provision should
be changed individually and not through a general amendment. Substantive
changes were accomplished in the following fields:
1. Public Finance: Because of the federal structure of Austria it was necessary to
find an agreement on the co-ordination of the budgetary and financial positions
between the territorial authorities to ensure that national procedures in the field
of public finances meet the obligations deriving from the Community
legislation. Firstly, a consultation mechanism was adopted. Its purpose is to
improve the financial co-ordination between central, regional and local
authorities. Secondly, the Austrian Stability Pact was adopted, which deals with
budgetary aspects in order to comply with the European Stability and Growth
Pact. It sets out a complex system of allocation rules of the deficit ratio between
the different regional and local authorities. However, these two agreements
cannot solve two problems, which arise out of the elaborated fiscal equalisation
between central and regional governments: Firstly, they do not provide for a
procedure in case of divergence with the figures of the Austrian Stability
Programme. Secondly, the interwoven character of the public finances leaves no
room for corrective budgetary action on the regional and local level.
2. Private law: The changes concern the law of accountancy, procedural law and
the law of the land register and company law: Since 1 January 1999 firms can
make out their balance sheet alternatively, either in schillings or in euros.
Further new provisions deal with the booking of the changeover costs. Actions
and entries are now also valid if made in the euro unit. It is now possible to
found new corporations in euro and to convert the joint capital of existing
corporations into euros; furthermore non-par-value shares were introduced
which make the conversion to the euro easier.
It was not necessary to take legislative measures to enforce the principle of
nominal value, since the principle of the continuity of contracts in case of an
alteration of the legal tender is deeply incorporated in Austrian private law.
3. The new statute of the Austrian Central Bank: The Central Bank Act 1998
transferred the decision making power from the General Council to the Board of
Executive Directors. The former main decision-making body, the General
Council which represents the shareholders of the Central Bank including the
Austrian social partners, has now only advisory capacities similar to the
functions of the supervisory board of a joint stock company. The appointment-
procedure, the minimum term of office and the ground of dismissal of the
members of the Board of Executive Directors were brought in accordance with
Community legislation and the state commissioner, who previously exercised
control to ensure the compliance with the Central Bank Act, has now only
advisory capacity.
Three aspects of the legislation relating to the euro are noteworthy:
1. The current amendments cover the necessary adjustments at the start of the
transitional period. Further amendments will be necessary at the start of the
circulation of euro banknotes and coins. These adjustments especially concern
the replacement of references in legal provisions to the schilling by references to
the euro.
2. Many legislative changes that were made with the adoption of the euro do not
refer to the euro, but to other realms of Community or national legislation. As a
result, the adoption of the euro led to legal clarity and legal certainty in a great
extent.
3. Many of the new provisions, especially in the Central Bank Act, are very
similar to the provisions in the Treaty or in the ESCB Statute, sometimes even
literally.
3. Trends Towards Spill Over
by Helmut Lang
A consensus exists among Austria's political players that tax harmonisation or
co-ordination is necessary in the euro-zone to avoid a competitive race towards
lower taxes. This concerns several direct taxes, especially taxes on capital gains
and corporate taxes. In order to achieve that goal Austria argues for qualified
majority voting in the Council in the field of taxation.
In the field of social and labour market policy a closer co-ordination of the
social policies of individual member states and the establishment of binding
minimum standards will be necessary. This shall avoid a competitive race
towards lower social standards.
Another priority is seen in European-wide efforts to reduce the tax-burden on
labour.
The political left favours the creation of EU policies in the fields in which nation
states lose their influence. The monetary and economic union needs as a
counterpart a political and social union. The political organisations belonging to
the political right, however, welcome the reduction of state interference in the
markets and do not argue in favour of a compensation for the loss of
competencies of the nation state on the European level.
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In Belgium, European integration has always been the object of a large
consensus among political leaders and organised interests. Well before the
adoption of the Maastricht treaty, the conviction that Belgium was a too small
and too open economic space to manage a truly independent monetary policy
was widespread. Belgian leaders were convinced, during the negotiations of the
Maastricht treaty, that the EMU would help the country, which had entered the
Mark zone some years earlier, retrieve some part of its monetary sovereignty.
Some conservative and even socialist politicians were also convinced that this
would help realise structural reforms which would otherwise be opposed strong
internal reluctance.
The only segments of the Belgian political class who opposed these projects
during the ratification of the Maastricht treaty were the extreme-right wing
parties, supporting a nationalist view of the State’s independence and usually
opposed to any form of further integration; and the Greens who, though they
agreed with the objectives of the EMU, contested the austerity inherent in the
process of convergence.
These initial positions have not been fundamentally altered since then. The
government has continued to present the Euro as an advantage for national
economic interests and as a starting-point for further European integration. A
political division remains visible between those who think that the Euro requires
further budgetary discipline and structural reforms of the labour market and
those who are trying to use it as a means for growth and employment policies.
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The opposition remains limited to the left wing and right-wing parties who
initially criticised the project. The new government, a coalition directed by the
Flemish liberal Guy Verhofstad and composed of liberal, socialist and Green
parties, installed after the general elections of June 1999, has not altered the
traditional Belgian position so far.
Belgian trade unions usually share left-wing parties’ opinions on the EMU.
Following the arguments made by the CSE during its Congress in Helsinki in
June 1999, they criticise the ECB for following the objective of price stability at
the expense of the other missions defined by the treaty (art. 105 CE: contribute,
without prejudice of this objective, to support the general economic policies in
the Community…).
Organised interests play an important role in the Belgium political system. Their
comments on the Euro have, however, been very rare, and limited to some
expected practical problems of the transition towards the Euro in January 2002.
The Fédération des entreprises de Belgique (The Employers’Federation, FEB)
is usually in favour of the Euro, on the ground of classic economic reasoning
(stability, lower transaction costs…). Belgian industries actually worry about the
practical effects the Euro might have in everyday management rather than about
macro-economic questions.
As in most other European countries, economic and financial newspapers play
an important role in the public’s perception of economic events. The opinions
published by these organs should thus not be ignored. The ECB’s decision to
reduce the main interest rate on April 8th 1999, has generally been welcomed by
economists in Belgium. Two arguments were made. First, this proved that the
ECB was not following a unilateral line and that it was able to pursue the
general objectives of the Community’s economic policy. Second, this decision
was seen as an answer to political discourses from France and Germany, which
would enhance the ECB’s independence because tensions with political leaders
would decline. The ECB’s decision to enhance its rates on November 4 1999 has
similarly been welcomed by most commentators. Though some economists were
surprised by the level of the enhancement, they understood it as a sign of
stability, as this gave the ECB the possibility not to change its rates for a longer
period. Some also underlined that this decision demonstrated that the ECB could
follow the general interest and not be strictly influenced by some member states,
as most German economists were not favourable to this decision which was on
the other hand welcomed by Ireland, Portugal, Spain…
The last Eurobarometer polls confirm that the Belgian population largely
supports the Euro. 76% of persons asked in March-April 1999 answered that
they were “for” the Euro, 2% more than in the former inquiry. Belgium thereby
has the third highest score in the EU, after Luxembourg and Italy. This is a
particularly high score if one underlines two parallel trends. First, the general
support for the Euro in the EU has been declining since the end of 1998, after a
two-year period of constant growth (47% “for” in March 1997; 64% in
September 1998; 61% in March 1999). Belgium is here an exception to this
evolution. Second, Belgium, which had been among the stronger supporters of
European integration generally speaking until 1994, has become since then a
relatively weak supporter. Only 47% of persons asked in March 1999 think that
“generally speaking (…) Belgian membership of the European Union is a good
thing”. Compared with the scores of Ireland (78%), Luxembourg (77%), the
Netherlands (73%), this is a relatively weak score, Belgium being at the ninth
rank, ex æquo with France.
The Belgian situation is close to the EU average in the case of the support to the
ECB: 44% tend to trust it. It is much less than its two Benelux partners: the
Netherlands (68%) and Luxembourg (61%). Within the members of the euro-
zone, Belgium reaches a medium rank. The high level of “no answer” (29%)
may be understood as a sign of the relatively low notoriety of the ECB (the level
of “no answer” for the committee of the Regions reaches 46%). The existence of
the ECB and its independence of Member States are usually not debated in
Belgium. 72% of persons asked support this, Belgium being at the third rank
here (after its two Benelux partners again and ex æquo with Italy).
Persons asked in Belgium usually think that they have received information
about the single currency (91%), though a much smaller proportion feel
informed (63%). When asked about their feelings about the Euro, most persons
mention their interest (76%) and a large majority of them say they feel
“European” (61%). More sentimental feeling do not seem to be part of the
question: a quite small proportion feel “enthusiastic” (41%) and very small
proportions express fears to be “powerless” (37%) or sadness (15%).
Most worries about the Euro remain limited to very practical aspects of the
question: people are, in a much larger proportion than in other member states,
worrying about the consequences the Euro might have on prices (67%, as
compared to 35% in the Euro-11), on the use of coins and notes and on the value
of their money (67% ; respectively 35 and 42 % in Euro 11).
The perception of the Euro in Belgium, and of the ECB's policies, are thus
largely favourable so far. Political discussions remain limited to the spill over it
might have, without contestation of its existence, while ordinary citizens
generally worry about the pragmatic problems the transition to the Euro might
have.
FRENCH REPORT
SUMMARY
Louis Chauvel*
Régis Chemain**
Jacques Le Cacheux***
1. Political Aspects
by Louis Chauvel
In France, after several years (1991-1998) of Euro-pessimism, a new era seems
to be coming with the present period of economic expansion.
During the period 1991-1998, the economical recession and the extension of
unemployment have impaired the French Euro-optimism of the 80’. The
European construction, which had been presented as an economical stabilising
project, ultimately appeared to be the cause of economical slow-down. The
typical criticism of the strong or extreme right and left political wings at the
beginning of the 90’: “European integration process = loss of the social
democracy construction and of national independence”, became pervasive. The
opinion trend of the beginning 90’ was clearly unpropitious to the EMU project.
Nevertheless, the European construction has conserved its strongest supports:
the parties of the centrist right and left political wings, the governmental
establishment and the social elite. These groups have found the force to cover
the voices of Euro-pessimists who could never express a credible alternative but
a simple non-constructive opposition.
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That pessimistic expansion stopped in 1997-1998, with a new period of relative
economical affluence and with the recovery of the public opinion’s confidence.
Now, the process of integration in the EMU system seems to be largely accepted
and no alternative exists. Even if many aspects of the project remain unclear and
uncertain in people’s mind, the opinion is less alarmed than some months ago.
The French citizen, who stated a lack of information on the EMU, has been
progressively better informed on the actual process.
Evidently, for the average citizen, the technical macroeconomic aspects of the
monetary policy are absolutely out of reach, and the impact of EMU seems to be
far away from everyday life: the expected positive impacts of EMU are the
improvement of international intra-european exchanges but little or no positive
impact concerning wages and living standards is anticipated. Thus, the situation
is closer to the submission to a prosaic and uncertain future than to the
enthusiastic agreement to a new fascinating world.
2. Legal Framework
by Régis Chemain
From 1993 to 2000 France made great legal progress in order to prepare the
introduction of the euro. Development was realised in two directions: at the
institutional level, the Banque de France became independent from the
government before being integrated in the ESCB, on the other hand, the use of
the euro has been facilitated or authorised for substituting the Franc.
Therefore, after being “in the hand of the government” the Banque de France
acceded to independence after a constitutional reform, which made it possible.
Thus, a first modification of its statutes by the Law of the 4/6/1993 gave a legal
independence to the monetary policy council of the bank and its members and
assigned to the bank the task of  maintaining price stability. Future will tell how
the bank will succeed in affirming its autonomy while the management of the
central bank still remains in the hands of a General Council in which the
government had a veto power. With the approval of the EMI, a second
modification of the statute of Bank de France was adopted by the law of
12/5/98. Its purpose was to enforce the independence of the bank and to allow
its integration within the ESCB. With that in mind, General Council
competencies are limited to the management questions which are not relevant
for ESCB missions. It is thought to be sufficient in order to guarantee monetary
policy council autonomy. Autonomy enforced by the integration in the ESCB
itself: the new statutes confirm that the Banque de France is part of the ESCB,
that it participates to the accomplishment of the objectives and missions of
ESCB... A problem still remains: will the institute be able to succeed in
affirming its autonomy while it could be said that it suffers of a lack of
democratic legitimacy?
A Law of 1/7/98 was adopted in order to facilitate the use of the euro. It includes
specific provisions aimed at producing this effect. For example, book-keeping
can now be in euro, rules concerning the conversion of bonds in euro are
established, the continuity of contracts from francs into euro is confirmed (but
this confirmation wasn’t necessary), information related to the use of euro by
public administration are given,  and so on. The development in the use of the
euro in France is less a legal problem than a political, and a sociological one.
3. From sacrifice to euphoria
by Jacques Le Cacheux
The so-called convergence process that has been implemented in Europe
following the Maastricht treaty and leading to monetary union may be
characterized as a long period of suffering: in order to meet the criteria for
participation in the single currency, member countries had to go through a long
and painful adjustment process, aiming at reducing inflation, budget deficits and
public debts, while keeping exchange rates reasonably fixed within the
European exchange rate mechanism. The outcome has been a decade of high
interest rates and restrictive fiscal and tax policies, resulting in exceptionally low
growth and high and rising unemployment. Even though the left-wing
government coming to power in June 1997 did campaign against the rigor of the
stability pact, France was among the very few countries meeting all Maastricht
criteria in May 1998 when membership for the monetary union was decided.
Partly because of a softening of monetary policy stance in most European
countries, the introduction of the euro has coincided with an improvement in
economic activity in most member states, so that criticism surrounding
macroeconomic policies in the EU have become less vocal. Yet, many of the
weaknesses identified in the European institutional setting have not been
remedied.
ECB monetary policy and diversity in national business cycle conditions
In the first three months following the introduction of the euro, the French —
and German — government constantly pleaded in favor of a softening of
monetary policy, in a context when Germany and Italy were experiencing a
quasi stagnation, while French growth was loosing momentum. Interest rates
were lowered only in April, after Oskar Lafontaine’s resignation, and some
smaller countries’ governments complained that their economies were already
overheating.
Since the beginning of the Summer 1999, the situation has changed drastically:
growth has accelerated everywhere, and, mostly due to oil price hikes, inflation
in many member states of the euro zone has come dangerously close to the 2%
upper limit set by the European Central Bank (ECB) — indeed exceeding 2% in
March 2000 in a number of countries; and the external exchange rate of the euro
— especially vis-à-vis the US dollar — has weakened considerably (by over
20% since January 1999). Although activity was still weak in large countries —
Germany and Italy —, the ECB raised interest rates three times between
November 1999 and March 2000, arousing suspicion that small economies were
weighing as much as larger ones in the decision process, which may
systematically lead to monetary policies ill-suited to the average economic
conditions in the euro zone.
National fiscal policy and taxation
The difficulties surrounding fiscal policy coordination and the constraints
exerted by the stability pact had been much debated before the launching of
monetary union. In particular, the French government had insisted on the
creation of an “ economic government ” for the euro zone, the “ Euro 11 ”.
However, thanks to buoyant economic activity, national budgets have turned out
easier to balance: deficits have been reduced and national governments are now
facing larger than expected receipts and have been announcing large tax cuts,
without much coordination though.
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1. Public Opinion
In Germany, the start of the third phase of the European Economic and
Monetary Union and the introduction of the new currency euro has been
regarded as a successful event and, at the same time, the public debate on the
principle decision to ‘sacrifice’ the German Mark came to an abrupt end. Taking
the rather hesitant position of many Germans as a starting point, the political
debate in Germany during the first year of the euro has been surprisingly ‘matter
of fact’. Long-term studies confirm a gradual increase of support for the single
currency until the beginning of 1999, when the third stage of EMU began.
During the last five years, the percentage of opponents was cut by half, whereas
the percentage of supporters doubled with a notable 30 percent undecided or
without an opinion. But if compared with figures from other member states, the
public support for the euro in Germany was weakest at the end of 1998.
While national opinion polls in Germany confirm the basic trends of support in
other member states with regard to the differences in age groups, educational
background and level of income, a Germany-specific finding is, however, that
there are significantly different results in West-Germany and the Eastern part of
the country. The East has continuously been much more sceptical than the West,
both with regard to the EU and the euro in general and with regard to the
personal advantages expected from the introduction of the single currency.
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Finally, the overall support for the euro differs substantially if one compares the
population as a whole and the political, administrational and economic elites in
Germany. More than 90 percent of the German elite is strongly or semi-strongly
supportive of the euro, whereas only 8 percent of the elite are explicitly against
the introduction.
Public opinion towards the euro has been generally more favourable in 1999
than before, however has been placed again under strain by the development of
the exchange rate against the US-Dollar. In addition, other reasons for the
decrease should be taken into account, such as the negative overall political
climate in Germany with a general decrease of support for the new coalition
government, the doubts about the political positions of the new government
regarding the Maastricht provisions, the Stability Pact and the independence of
the ECB as well as the subsequent resignation of Lafontaine. Furthermore, the
political debate in Germany on European affairs was exclusively marked by the
question of the German contribution to the Union’s budget, the negotiations
leading to the Agenda 2000, and by the ongoing Kosovo conflict.
Institutional Aspects and Procedures
Monetary decisions of the ECB were received differently by various actors, in
particular with regard to the effects on growth and employment. Actors in
favour of an active (state) labour market policy were more positive towards
interest rates cuts than to rate hikes, whereas the financial markets in general
welcomed the November decision of the ECB and were speculating about more
hikes in the year 2000.
The first monetary decision of the ECB with regard to the main interest rates
taken on 8 April 1999 was first and foremost regarded as a “courageous
historical step”. The weakness of the economies in the core countries of the
euro-zone, i.e. France, Germany and Italy, were not seen as resulting primarily
from the level of interest rates fixed by the ECB, but from outstanding structural
reforms in the areas of economic, fiscal and social policy. Not even the very
favourable exchange rate against the US-Dollar, particularly important for the
export oriented German economy, was able to conceal the consequences of these
political shortcomings. It was also noted that it was politically and not
economically necessary for the ECB to leave the rates unchanged until the end
of March.
In November 1999, the increase of interest rates by the ECB was expected,
however the German press speculated on the scope of the decision and the
explanation of the decision to be given by ECB-President Duisenberg. The
financial markets had already anticipated the increase by increasing the capital
market interest rates themselves. Most economists and the large employer
organisations welcomed the decision, analysts and stock market traders in
Frankfurt also stayed calm, i.e. an expert opinion poll carried out in November
1999 concluded that “apparently the rate move has strengthened the confidence
in the European monetary policy”. On the other hand, Trade Unions and
commentators in various newspapers were very sceptical towards the move of
the ECB. A modification of the interest rates was seen as “both dangerous for
the business cycle and unnecessary for stability. (…) Neither the growth of the
M3 nor the development of the price index indicate any need for action”.
The exchange rate against the US-Dollar has been a constant topic in the public
debate. Contrary to public opinion, most analysts and politicians constantly
reiterated the advantages of the current exchange rate while referring to an
expected upward trend in coming months.
The ‘Council of economic advisers’ (Sachverständigenrat – five wise persons)
of the government, when presenting its annual opinion on the economic outlook
of the country, referred to the current introductory phase of the euro and the
need to gain the notion of a “hard currency”. The development of the exchange
rate should not be dramatised but at the same time not be played down. But,
again, the reasons for the weak position of the euro on the international financial
markets are to be found on the national rather than on the European level. There
are actual causes for the weakness of the euro vis-à-vis other currencies, but
these existed before the birth of the euro.
The question of the independence of the ECB has been regarded as at risk during
the first months of 1999 due to the demands by Lafontaine. His resignation has
ended this debate and the ECB’s independence has been seen as restored. The
issue of publishing detailed minutes of the ECB-Council, probably including a
summary of the decision-making process within the ECB-Council, as well as its
voting records, has been discussed at great length in the German media and
within the financial circuit. Generally, most commentators have rejected the
view of some critics that publicising minutes would add to the transparency of
the policy-making of the ECB. On the other hand, an opinion poll shows a 53%
majority of professional German ECB-watchers saying that the transparency of
monetary policy decision-making is not sufficient. Fifty-five percent are
suggesting that the ECB should be more explicit on the weighting of the various
indicators resulting in the ECB’s inflation perspective. Forty-four percent are
demanding not only a better explanation, but in addition a concrete inflation
prognosis.
2. Legal Framework
The administrative and legal work for the completion of the conversion from the
DM to the euro has been continued throughout the year and is expected to be
finalised in 2000. In order to prepare decisions and legal measures, a special
Task Force on the EMU (AS WWU, panel on the legal and administrative
implementation of EMU) of the Ministry of Finances and other ministries was
established. In addition to this central task force, similar task forces were
established on subordinate levels, in other ministries and on the level of the
Länder.
At the end of 1997, the Bundesbank Act was adapted to the requirements of the
third stage of the EMU. Apart from the amendments needed due to the
integration of the Bundesbank in the ESCB, also the term in office of members
of the Zentralbankrat had to be extended from two to five years, and, more
importantly, the right of the Federal Government to defer decisions of the
Zentralbankrat for up to two weeks had to be repealed. The monetary financing
of the government had already been abolished in 1994.
Essentially, there have been three legislative acts on the introduction of the euro
(Euro-Einführungsgesetze) in the past years. The first legal act concerns the
abolition of the Discount and Lombard rate, the replacement of the FIBOR with
the EURIBOR and the opening up of company law for the use of the euro, of
accounting law and of debt enforcement proceedings, amendments of other
legislation, e.g. the Currency Act and the Insurance Supervision Act. The second
legal act deals with social security and tax administrations regulations as well as
customs matters with the principle that the transition to the euro should be made
possible as from January 1999 for the areas concerned. The third act mainly
refers to the revised version of the Coinage Act (MünzG) and contains the
modalities of the issuing of the euro coins and bank notes including
commemorative coins. On 1 January 2002 the euro will be the only legal means
of payment in the Federal Republic of Germany (legal Big Bang) while DM-
cash can be used until 28 February.
Finally, due to the official seat of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt/Main,
several other legal measures had to be taken in order to set the conditions for the
work of a European institution in Germany. This included the ensuring of the
inviolability of the ECB’s premises, its official communication and
correspondence, as well as the permission to have its own armed security
service. Furthermore, the ECB is freed from direct taxation or import duties.
Neither the German data protection law is applied to the ECB nor the legal
requirements with regard to employment regulations. Finally, the members of
the ECB Executive Board benefit from the diplomatic status by being granted
full privileges and exemptions.
Finally, a debate has been initiated as a consequence of the introduction of the
euro. It concerns the division of tasks between the Bundesbank and the Land
Central Banks as well as the decision-making procedures within the
Bundesbank. The President of the Bundesbank is pushing for a drastic reform of
the present model which would result in transforming the Land Central Banks
into subordinate directorates of the Bundesbank. The Land Central Banks are
offering a reduction of the number of Land Central Banks from nine to seven.
Until now, the Finance Minister favours the ‘centralistic Bundesbank Board
option’. The reform of the Bundesbank should come into effect as of 2003.
3. Trends Towards Spill-over
The Economic and Monetary Union could become an initiator of spill over
processes in other policy fields. In the light of marked differences between the
member states of the currency Union, the necessity for more harmonisation, co-
operation or even integration in certain areas might be perceived. The German
debate in 1999 has centred around three aspects: tax harmonisation, the proposal
for macroeconomic co-ordination between the member states and finally the
intensified co-ordination of exchange rate policy.
With regard to tax competition, it has been noted in a governmental analysis that
the mobility of the factor of production capital has resulted in a “certain pressure
on the convergence of tax systems”. Countries with a high tax burden including
income, wage, trade and especially capital gains and energy taxes could be
structurally put at a disadvantage in Euroland, if there are more favourable terms
in another member state in the euro-zone. For some politicians and analysts, this
perceived „race to the bottom“, i.e. the competition about the lowest tax rates in
Europe, could lead to a loss of billions of euro for the local authorities and the
state through loopholes in the international tax system. Governments will no
longer be able to act according to the priority of creating new employment. An
“ex-ante” harmonisation by co-ordinating taxation policies would prevent this.
For others, this fear is exaggerated and an “ex-post” harmonisation by an
unimpeded competition is much more suitable. Less developed countries would
be more flexible and could therefore catch up on other countries.
With regard to the co-ordination of the exchange rate policy, in which the
ECOFIN-Council is considered to be playing a crucial role, a fierce and short
discussion developed between Lafontaine and Duisenberg, the President of the
European Central Bank. Lafontaine demanded – with the support of Strauss-
Kahn - a direct support by the ECB for the national finance policies.
Additionally, the co-operation with the United States should be improved in
order to strengthen the exchange rate stability between the US-Dollar and the
euro. The discussions initiated by the German and French governments highlight
the potential for spill over effects in the policy areas mentioned above.
Lafontaine demanded a balanced policy-mix of wage, monetary and fiscal
policy, active employment policy and sustainable economic reforms, in order to
make full use of the scope for growth while respecting stability.
These proposals were also controversially discussed in Germany. The
macroeconomic dialogue (Cologne Process from June 1999) constitutes the
„third pillar” of the European Employment Pact. This new element is intended
to improve the conditions for a co-operative macro-economic policy mix geared
to further growth and employment while maintaining price stability. In general,
most commentators are cautious about the effectiveness of this macroeconomic
dialogue. The expert opinion of the five wise persons was rather critical;
although it will be useful for decision-makers to inform each other, a formal co-
ordination between European monetary policy and national fiscal policy is
considered “questionable”.
Another trend towards spill over seems to be established with regard to capital
income taxation. The same can be said, with a similar argumentation,
concerning policy on wages, another area for possible spill over tendencies.
GREEK REPORT
SUMMARY
Nikos Frangakis*
A main characteristic of the debate on EMU in Greece is the fact that
participation to the Union has appeared as a major politic goal; a goal distant,
elusive and decisive for the integration of Greece in the international system.
The fear of lagging behind the Maastricht criteria, of being left out, have
reduced critical approaches to the construction of EMU itself to academic or to
expected political arguments. The transposition of the discussion on optimal
currency areas is an example of the form, the stance of the Communist
Party/KKE or of the splinter – Socialist/DIKKI of the latter. Interest groups have
not been especially influential in that context, be they industrialists, trade unions
or farmers’ unions.
The gradual attainment of the nominal convergence goals (“the Maatricht
criteria”), with an emphasis up to 1998 on budgetary self-restraint and deficit-
fighting and from then onwards on reducing inflation to its final target has
created growing self-confidence. This, in turn, has made for less and less social
unrest addressed to EMU participation, notwithstanding an increasing rise in
unemployment.
Having ended 1999 with a public finances deficit of 1,7% of GDP where in the
mid-Nineties it was still in double-digit levels, having secured a CPI of 2,3%
                                                          
* Director of the EKEME - Athens.
compared to 8% in the beginning of the period and having produced a
downward slope in public debt (which still stands at 102.1% of GDP), Greece
has achieved a notable break with a decades-long past of instability.
The consensual approach to stabilisation adopted by the post-1993 Governments
has slowed down the pace of structural reforms e.g. the radical overhaul of
Social Security, privatisation of a bloated public sector, markets liberalisation
(first and foremost the labour market, but also opening up of closed trades,
energy and telecom liberalisation).
Still, the growing feeling of success felt by the main factors of the economy as
well as in public opinion at large and increasing pragmatism in the conduct of
economic policy are helping for such reforms to be widely accepted as
necessary, if not inevitable. It is a widespread view that structural reforms will
be stepped up as part of the challenge to introduce the Euro, or as a consequence
of the need to adapt to the expected Eurozone rigours. It is also noteworthy that
both institutional reforms to introduce Central Bank independence and de facto
independent conduct of monetary policy have been legitimised in Greek public
opinion largely with reference to ECB standards of conduct.
Overall, EMU participation may prove for Greece the core element of a new
sense of belonging.
It is true that public opinion towards the EU has been shifting in Greece towards
less positive levels than those observed up to 1998; 22.8% of Greeks were wary
of the EU in mid-1999 while 14.1% were indifferent (up 5% compared with
1998). A decrease in public interest in European affairs (-11.6% compared with
1998) is also to be noted. But a major part of such change in attitudes can be
attributed to the Kosovo crisis and the region-specific reactions in Greek public
opinion to the perceived role of Europe in the Balkans.
But if one turns to the matter of EMU and the Euro, 55% of Greeks considered
in 1999 success to join “the primary goal of the country”; although lower than
the 64.5% of late 1998 such an approval rate for the Euro is far higher in Greece
than in other pre-in countries. Indeed support for the Euro in Greece has been
higher than the average of EU countries, notwithstanding the fact that EU-wide
such support is considerably higher in Eurozone countries than in the “pre-ins”.
ITALIAN REPORT
SUMMARY
Marina Mancini*
Elena Rigacci Hay*
Natalino Ronzitti**
1. Political Aspects
by Elena Rigacci Hay
Through the years Italians have been the most enthusiastic supporters among
Europeans of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and of the introduction of
the Euro. Various polls conducted in 1999 clearly confirmed that perception2. At
the same time, the polls have shown a lack of awareness by Italian citizens on
basic facts related to the Euro. They did not have the precise concept of the
EMU, its membership, as well as the value of the Euro and practical
consequences of its actual introduction, its impact on price fluctuations,
exchange operations, adjustment of savings. The Italian public believed that the
introduction of the Euro would have positive long term effects on currency
stability vis-a-vis US dollar, and would stimulate economic growth and improve
the employment indexes.
Italy has been able to meet European targets for fiscal consolidation, while
beginning the introduction of wide-range reforms, aimed at modernising the
public sector and the tax system. The process is continuing successfully. The
slight slow down of Italian economy during the spring of 1999 prompted the
Italian government to immediately come with responsible report to the
Commission of a new lower forecast of its deficit over GDP. This provoked
some criticism from the opposition parties. However, the economic community
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and principal political institutions expressed their strong support to continued
policy of reforming Italian political and economic system, which, in their view,
would allow achieving even more ambitious fiscal targets3.
The Bank of Italy has expressed positive criticism of the European Central Bank
(ECB)’s monetary policies, which had been coherent with its main task -
maintaining price stability in the Euro-zone. However some Italian economists4
retain that the restrictive policies of the ECB tend to worsen domestic problems,
unemployment in particular, and have negative effect on investments. In general
though, the Italian institutions and experts strongly support the structural
reforms of the national economy in order to fully benefit from positive effects of
the ECB monetary policies5.
There is unanimity of Italian economists and institutions on the issue of
accountability and independence of the ECB. They support the independence of
the ECB from national governments in the implementation of monetary policy.
However one of the possible risks for the ECB is becoming too technical and
lacking of democratic accountability. One of the possible effective means to
avoid this, would be continued and strengthened accountability of the ECB
towards the European Parliament6.
The co-ordination between the ECB and National Central Banks cannot be
based on the subsidiarity principle, in accordance with which only residual
powers are left in the hands of the national banks, including prudential
supervision, research and analyses activities and state treasury. Numerous
committees have been brought into existence for each of the technical branches
of the ECB in which Italian representatives can express their opinions. In view
of the Italian Euro Committee7 the co-ordination between the Italian Central
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Bank and the ECB is also guaranteed through the participation of the governors
of national banks in the ECB Council.
2. Legal Framework
by Marina Mancini
Italy took its first steps towards the EMU immediately after signing the
Maastricht Treaty. Legislative Decree no. 385 of 1 September 1993 and Law no.
483 of 26 November 1993 contained some provisions aimed at making the Bank
of Italy consistent with the model of an independent national central bank, as
outlined by the EC Treaty.
But the first legislative act specifically concerning the transition from the Italian
currency to the euro was Law no. 433 of 17 December 1997. With this law,
Parliament delegated the Government to issue the legislative decrees needed to
give full effect to the EC provisions on transition to the third stage of the
Monetary Union and to assure the compatibility of national law, on the one
hand, with the EC Treaty and ESCB Statute, on the other hand. Three legislative
decrees were enacted in execution of the delegation.
The first of them, Legislative Decree no. 43 of 10 March 1998, regulated the
transfer of certain powers from the Bank of Italy to the ECB, such as the power
to fix the interest rate on interest-bearing current account deposits at the Bank of
Italy and the power to make changes in the discount rate and the interest on
advances. Moreover, it regulated the issuing of money by the Bank of Italy after
Italy’s adoption of the single currency: the Italian Central Bank may issue
banknotes through the authority received from the ECB; similarly, it may mint
coins with the approval of the ECB.
The EMI convergence report, issued in the same month in which the Italian
Government enacted Legislative Decree n. 43, expressed a positive opinion on
the state of adaptation of the Italian legislation, including the Statute of the Bank
of Italy, to the EC Treaty and the ESCB Statute.
No remarkable repetition of the EC Treaty and EC regulations concerning the
introduction of the euro is contained in the Italian legislative acts passed to
render the Italian legal system consistent with the single currency.
Possible conflicts between Italian law and EC law with respect to the
introduction of the euro are pointed out by the Italian scholars. They are related
to the principle of the continuity of contracts, established by Article 3 of
Regulation no. 1103 of 17 June 1997, on the one hand, and certain well-
established principles governing contracts, enshrined in the Italian civil code, on
the other hand. But, till now, no case concerning these conflicts have come
before the Italian Courts.
No case concerning the application of the EC regulations regarding the
introduction of the euro or the application of the legislative acts passed to render
the Italian legal system consistent with the single currency have come before the
Italian judges.
3. Trends Towards Spill Over
by Elena Rigacci Hay
Fiscal harmonisation is considered by Italian institutions and most economists
the only way to iron out possible distortions of the single market that could
trigger harmful competition among the member states. Reform of the fiscal
system and further reduction of fiscal pressure is envisaged as particularly
necessary for Italy where it accounts for 52% of gross income, the highest in
Europe8. Therefore, Italy is willing to implement a tax harmonisation with other
European countries. However, due to the high Italian public debt, this process
may follow a slower pace of implementation than in other European countries9.
Following Italy’s success in joining the EMU in January 1999, Italian social
policies have been strengthened, especially in tackling the most pressing
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problems of unemployment, pensions and education. It is generally accepted that
the introduction of the Euro is not expected to positively effect employment in
the short term. Massimo D’Alema, the former Italian Prime Minister, maintains
that there is no direct relationship between participation in EMU and reduction
of unemployment rate10. However, it may accelerate the path of structural
reforms creating a greater flexibility on the job market and stimulating
investments into infrastructure. This could also have a revitalising effect in
increase of productivity, acceleration of technological development and
investment into human capital.
In relation to the Italian Pension System, notwithstanding some disagreements
among the trade unions, it is generally believed, that gradual reforms should be
implemented. The Pension System Fund should be strengthened in view of
future problems to sustain it by active labour11.  Italy needs also improvement of
its education system, making it competitive with the highest European standards,
adapting it to the real needs of the labour market as well as strengthening the
teaching of languages, computer and technical skills12.
Some Italian economists feel that the common European monetary policy is
deeply affecting the pace towards a common European macroeconomic policy
and creates the need for strict economic co-ordination among European
countries. They therefore, suggest that the ECB should enlarge its prerogatives
and take all decisions related to economic policies, from labour to fiscal and
budgetary matters13. The Euro 11 is widely accepted as the place where common
economic policy should be created and implemented.
It is generally viewed that the ECB, responsible for monetary policies, should
maintain full autonomy in conducting exchange policies. In accordance with this
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approach, governments could only suggest possible exchange policies, but the
ECB will take them into consideration only if they do not contradict its main
objective, price stability14. Up to now Italian economic institutions positively
assessed the degree of co-ordination between national governments and the
ECB. Some economists retain that the EMU will remove the risk of exchange
rate fluctuation and will protect prices from inflation, promoting the Euro as a
means of payment and investment abroad. The Euro will also influence markets
and currency interest rates and it may become a powerful tool in influencing
world economic and financial policies15. The latest fall of the Euro, in December
1999, did not create concern among Italian financial institutions, but further
underlined the need to strengthen structural reforms of the national economic
system16.
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PORTUGUESE REPORT
SUMMARY
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1. Political Aspects
Public opinion
Portugal’s participation in the single currency was regarded as an important
national achievement, as most Portuguese were sceptical on the capacity of
Portugal to fulfil the convergence criteria.
The majority of the citizens (59%) support the single currency, but Portugal has
one of the lowest support level percentages of the Euro 11 countries. This low
support level percentages is explained by the large number of “no opinion”
(18%), which is one of the highest of the EU members. In Portugal people
continue to be least likely to feel informed about the single currency and the
most widespread worry is not having enough information about the Euro.
Portugal is the only “Euro 11” country where less than 3 in 10 people feel well-
informed (28%).
There is not, however, a reliable national poll, private or public, on public
opinion on the single currency, apart from specific polls on economic sectors.
According to a Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) study, 58% of the Portuguese
companies expect benefits from the Euro. The reduction of the exchange
fluctuation risk between the Euro 11 is seen by Portuguese businessmen as the
Euro principal advantage, and tourism and some export sectors are the most
benefited, once the majority of their exports are destined to EU countries. The
transitional period is nonetheless regarded with some apprehension.
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There is not a reliable national poll on the effects of the Stability Pact on
Economic growth and unemployment. The issue has been discussed only in the
press by some politicians and economists. Most Portuguese economists and
politicians analyses converge on the need to review the stability pact. Pointing
out the monetary policy’s limits to accelerate economic activity and reduce
unemployment, Portuguese remind that: 1) the labour market flexibility isn’t yet
fulfilled and the counter-cycle policy can’t exclude some budgetary help, and 2)
the accomplishment of public debt limits the indebtedness capacity and, in
consequence, the investment capacity of member States.
As a consequence of the low level of knowledge and awareness of Portuguese
citizens about the European Central Bank, the majority of Portuguese citizens do
not have an opinion on transparency and independence of the Central Bank.
According to Europinion, in December 1998, almost half of the Portuguese
ignored that with Euro there would be a European Central Bank. Not
surprisingly, the percentage of no opinion (36%) is, once again, the highest of
the EU members. A positive note, however is that an average of 86% Portuguese
citizens (one of the highest in EU countries) feel that information campaigns
should cover the role of the European Central Bank, showing a great concern
towards the role of the EBC.
According to Eurobarometer 64% of Portuguese citizens consider that the single
currency requires an independent European Central Bank, while 11% are
against. 68% of the Portuguese supports that the European Central Bank has to
be accountable for its decisions to the European Parliament, while 6% are
against. The percentage of Portuguese with no opinion in this question is, once
again, significantly high, 26%.
Portuguese reactions to the policy measures taken by the ECB are quite
favourable. Even if Euro devaluation toward US dollar is referred as unexpected
in almost every press article, politicians and economists consider it more an
American success than a European failure. Emphasising America’s
extraordinary good economic conjuncture, Portuguese remind European
particular political context in 1999: the Kosovo war, the resignation of the
Commission, the difficulties to approve the European budget and Agenda 2000,
all of which have weakened the confidence in the Euro. Specialists also refer to
European’s particular situation, being a closed, self-sustainable economy, as a
factor to diminish the impact of Euro devaluation towards the dollar.
Considering it is wrong to defend target zones between the Euro and the dollar,
and that the ECB should not assign a foreign-exchange objective for Euro,
ECB’s monetary policy decisions, lowering the interest rates were well accepted
by the Portuguese experts. Price stability was achieved in 1999 and, therefore,
the overall opinion considers that the Maastricht treaty objectives have so far
been accomplished.
Economists and politics referred however that Euro hadn’t had any particular
positive effects. European economic growth was extremely low (around 2%)
and unemployment reduction hasn’t been worth noting. In this regard, the results
of the single currency project have so far not totally matched the original
expectations of the Portuguese public opinion, mainly in terms of its impact on
economic growth and structural reforms.
Institutional Positions
After 1 January 1999, institutional positions haven’t changed much. The debate
remains seized on real convergence versus nominal convergence, but
oppositions to Euro have decreased. There was also a generalised euphoria on
the fact that Portugal had the capacity to fulfil the convergence criteria,
belonging to the Euro zone since its inception.
The Government repeatedly supported that the “option to Euro wasn’t a
monetary option, but an option on development and competitiveness”. Once the
Euro has already been achieved, the Portuguese Governmental programme of
1999 refers as a major concern the need to promote national convergence
towards average of EU economic development. Benefiting from the Portuguese
Presidency of 2000, the Portuguese government has attempted a new European
long-term project, relating initiatives on macro-economic policy, structural
reforms and employment policies. Improving Europe’s competitiveness while
promoting social cohesion is the objective which fits the controlling goal of
Portuguese European policy: that nominal convergence must be complemented
with real convergence.
Despite the government-generalised optimism, most institutions remained silent
about Euro. It is rather difficult to find an institutional position about Euro,
favourable or not, after 1 January 1999, as it seams most institutions
pragmatically consider that “if Portugal has joined the EMU, we have to live
with Euro and, so, there is no point in discussing the matter”.
Institutional positions regarding the Stability Pact on economic growth and
unemployment and transparency and independence of the ECB are, therefore,
non-existent or quite vague, with the exception of the parliamentary position.
Portuguese Parliament, and specially its Euro Sub-committee, support a larger
control of the ECB, and have even approved a resolution on more control of the
ECB by the Parliament. Following a proposal of the Portuguese MP Francisco
Torres and the English MEP Donnelly, COSAC has also approved the
realisation of mixed meetings between the European Parliament and the
National Parliaments, which have already taken place twice and will continue to
occur.
2. Legal Framework
EMU required important changes in the Bank of Portugal statute. These changes
have been progressively assured in successive revisions of the organic law on
the national central Bank, and have, even, determined a revision of article 102 of
the Portuguese constitution, relative to the Bank of Portugal, in order to make
the central bank independent from government directives.
In 1996 price stability was established in the law as the primary objective of the
Central Bank. At the same time, the overdraft facility and direct purchases of
government were officially abolished.
The Law 5/98 introduced important changes in the Portuguese Central Bank
statute. Aiming at a reinforcement of its autonomy, especially regarding the
central government, this law characterised the Portuguese Central Bank as an
independent monetary authority. Structural changes were also introduced in the
legal personality of the national central bank. Initially a public owned company,
the Portuguese Central Bank is now a special legal entity governed by public
law and enjoying administrative and financial autonomy.
3. Trends Towards Spill-over
Portuguese public opinion unanimously defends the need of a tax reform. There
is also a general perception among Portuguese that euro will have important
effects on taxation but that is not necessarily related with the claims for tax
harmonisation.
Businessmen and bankers have constantly pushed the Government for an
important tax reform during 1999. But they couple that with a claim for tax
harmonisation. Tax reform is seen as the solution to ensure Portuguese
companies competitiveness and tax harmonisation is needed to avoid serious
distortion of prices and savings taxation inequalities, which will be more evident
with euro. Taxation is also seen as a solution to obviate the loss of some
important adjustment mechanisms.
Portugal favours therefore the current projects for European tax harmonisation
and has made it one of its presidency priorities, even if Portuguese are fully
aware of the difficulties of tax co-ordination and harmonisation in the EU.
Financial operations assessment and banking secrecy are particular sensitive
issues, and unanimity, at national level or at a European level will be extremely
difficult to obtain.
Social policy is the most polemical sector. Although there is a common feeling
towards the need of spill overs in the area of social policy because of the Euro,
Portuguese politicians, institutions, businessmen, trade unions, discuss and
diverge on the consequences and solutions. Employment mobility and waging
harmonisation are two particularly sensitive issues.
While trade unions defend euro’s negative effects on employment, leading to
Portugal’s loss of competitiveness and consequently to unemployment,
demanding therefore more employment protection; businessmen defend the need
to reform the labour market and make it more flexible. Labour policy is
considered an alternative solution to exchange policy rigidity, in case of
asymmetric chocks.
But Portuguese also fear that with Euro, the labour market imposes a
diminishing of labour rights and/or the transformation of Portugal in a peripheral
country characterised by low cost labour. Waging harmonisation, however, is
considered impossible for businessmen and the Portuguese government. The
specificity of Portugal’s economy and the low Portuguese productivity
determines the impossibility to accept a EU imposition on minimum wages.
There is a general consensus with respect to Portugal’s need of making
“substantial progress” in sectors like justice and health, because of the Euro.
Portugal must urgently find new methods to finance social security, education
and health. The national health system and the absence of a well functioning
house renting market are some areas unanimously considered as “affecting
economic efficiency and rising inflationary pressures”.
Portuguese are fully aware of Euro’s implications on policy mix. Without an
exchange policy and having to comply with the Stability Pact criteria, members
of Euro 11 must co-ordinate their macroeconomic policies. In 1999, the
Portuguese external deficit has significantly increased, a situation that could be
easily dealt with by a macroeconomic policy reducing domestic consumption
and stimulating exports, an exchange policy. The non-existence of the traditional
mechanisms of macroeconomic policy and the difficulties in setting up
European policies of that type is a cause of concern, once Portugal has yet to
experience the most important external chocks, and Portuguese economy
behaviour is already showing signs of difficulties.
Portuguese’s concerns also relate to the acceleration of financials mergers and
economic concentration in Europe. This trend is seen as diminishing Portuguese
control over the main sectors of the economy and emphasises Portuguese
peripheral statute.
Although Portugal defends the emergence of a true European economic policy
as it becomes clear from its efforts during the current Presidency and although
the ECB has its competencies well defined, European political power is not yet
well defined in the economic area and a development of the powers of co-
ordination of the different national policies and of EU instruments to combat
unemployment and promote competitiveness and real convergence is promoted
by Portugal. It is also argued that external projection of the Euro demands a
decision-making system that effectively works.
SPANISH REPORT
SUMMARY
Manuel López Escudero*
Juan Carlos Monedero Fernández-Gala**
As a result of Spanish participation in the third and final stage of European
Monetary Union, the Spanish Legal System was modified especially in two
matters: the status of Spanish Central Bank (Banco de España) and the legal
framework of the currency unit.
Previously, the Spanish Central Bank was an institution submitted to the
Government. Articles 108 and 109 of EC Treaty impose on the Member States
the obligation to assure strong independence of national central banks.
Consequently, Spanish legislators modified the statutes of Banco de España and
two laws were adopted: Act 13/1994, which transferred monetary policy power
to the Spanish Central Bank and guaranteed its autonomy, and Act 12/1998,
which modified the status of Banco de España in order to assure its integration
in the European System of Central Banks.
The institutional structure of Banco de España was modified to take into account
the position of the Governor (member of the Governing Council of the European
Central Bank) and to assure the independence of members of the Governing
Council of the Banco de España. The term of office for these members was
extended to six years.
The Spanish Central Bank’s powers were also modified, because the European
Central Bank assumes responsibility for elaborating the single monetary policy
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in the final stage of EMU. Since January 1999 the Banco de España has had two
type of functions:
- Functions as a member of ESCB: execution in Spain of monetary policy
measures adopted by the European Central Bank, promotion of cross-
border payment and securities settlement transactions in the Euro area by
the TARGET system, management of foreign exchange reserves
according to instruction of the ECB, etc.
- Other functions with an internal dimension: holding and managing the
Spanish foreign exchange reserves not transferred to ECB, supervisory
authority to foster the stability of credit institution and the financial
system, promote the stability of the national payment system, managing
the Spanish Public Debt, etc.
In relation to the legal framework of the common currency unit, Spain adopted a
general legislative act and others regulations in technical matters. Act on the
introduction of the euro (Ley 46/1998), dated 17 December 1998, adapts the
Spanish Legal System to the introduction of the Euro as the Common European
Currency. Although the regulations relating to the Euro legal framework are
directly applicable, this Act develops and completes community rules. Some
Articles of Act 46/1998 are not in agreement with the ECJ case law concerning
direct applicability of community regulations, but this Act has a high quality and
makes easier the introduction of the Euro in Spanish Law.
The analysis of the impact of the euro in Spain requires situating the role played
by Europe during the long franquist dictatorship and the subsequent transition to
democracy. During that period Europe played a mythical role, as it was
identified with the absent democracy, with modernisation and, definitively, with
everything that rejected the dictatorship. At present, the absence of a deep
debate among citizenship is traduced into a wide support to all that implies
“Europe”, although this is accompanied by not a lesser ignorance of the meaning
of the European institutions and their performance. In this sense, the attitude of
the public opinion with regard to the euro has been characterised by a lack of
interest and the absence of relevant controversies over this matter. This has been
happening even at moments when some of the decisions of the European Central
Bank were not the most suitable for Spain which went through certain problems
with the prices that worsened with the lower interest rates decided in Frankfurt.
In short, in Spain the euro is neither criticised nor praised.
Regarding the different economical, trade unionist and political forces, there is
no verified opposition to the common currency. The major impediments
occurred in previous stages, specially concerning the adjusting plans that were
initiated in order to achieve the convergence criteria. Once Spain entered the
common currency, the support of practically the whole of the social forces has
become a reality. The only relevant exception was Izquierda Unida, the third
parliamentary political force during this first year of existence of the euro
(2.700.000 votes), which showed its position pro a control of the ECB by the
European Parliament, the completion of the Economic and Monetary Union with
a Political Union, and its opposition to the Stability Agreement. After the
elections in March 2000, this political force has lost half of its votes, which
situates the positions critical to the present process of European construction in a
marginal place.
From the point of view of private entrepreneurs, the unanimous opinion
concerning the capacities of the euro is linked to a previous preparation during
the years before the introduction of the common currency. Even though the euro
increases the competition among the European companies these as well as banks
believe that the increase in business turnover will compensate such larger
competition. The main Spanish trade unions, which have already stated their
“critical support” to the European Union Treaty, have held this position,
showing likewise their agreement to the introduction of euro. In this regard they
express their belief that the common currency will exercise a spill over effect on
other fields, such as tax policies, social policies, social security, etc. However,
trade unions still alert on deferment of the social aspects that would not be
guaranteed just by the existence of a common currency.
SWEDISH REPORT
SUMMARY
Eric Clapham*
1. Political Aspects
Sweden applied for EU membership in 1990. Following a referendum on 13
November 1994 where 53% voted in favour of membership, Sweden joined the
union 1 January 1995. The government appointed a commission 19 October
1995 to consider the consequences of Swedish participation in the third stage of
EMU. The commission, led by Professor Lars Calmfors, consisted of seven
economists and presented its conclusions in October 199617.
The commission considered the impact of the Euro on the overall economy,
conditions for stabilisation policy and political consequences. The conclusion
reached was that EMU membership would promote economic efficiency and
Swedish political influence in Europe, but would worsen the conditions for a
successful stabilisation policy. Therefore the Swedish economy should not join
the third stage in 1999, but wait until its economy had improved. Flexibility-
enhancing reform, especially as regards the labour market, was deemed
necessary.
In a bill18 accepted by parliament 4 December 1997, the government proposed
that Sweden should not join the third stage in 1999, but remain prepared to do so
at a later date. The main argument for this policy was the lack of public support
for the Euro, as documented by public polls and other indicators.
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General Public
A poll made by Statistics Sweden in November 1997 showed that 23% of
Swedes would vote in favour of EMU in a referendum. Since then the trend has
been towards increasing support for the Euro, with supporters outnumbering
sceptics for the first time after the successful introduction of the Euro on 1
January 1999. Thereafter support decreased somewhat again, possibly due to
negative publicity surrounding the weakness of the Euro against the dollar.
Endorsement of the EMU by several members of Government boosted public
support towards the end of 1999, but it has recently declined again.
In a referendum on Swedish EMU membership, would you vote yes or no?
Surveys are based on 1000 interviews. All figures are percentages.
Oct. 98 Jan. 99 May 99 Jun. 99 Oct. 99 Dec. 99 Jan. 00 Feb. 00 Mar. 00
Yes 39 45 38 36 43 44 40 39 38
No 44 38 44 46 40 41 41 42 44
Do not know 17 17 17 18 17 15 19 19 18
Källa: Sifo Research & Consulting 2000
In a referendum on Swedish EMU membership, would you vote yes or no?
The survey is based on 1000 interviews during 29 Nov – 2 Dec 1999. All figures are percentages.
Gender Employment Dwelling
Women Men Private Public Blue collar White collar Urbana) Rural
Yes 32 56 48 37 31 57 57 33
No 49 33 40 47 53 31 29 52
Do not know 20 10 13 17 17 12 14 15
a) Three largest cities
Source: Sifo Research & Consulting 1999
Institutional positions
Employers’ organisations have long favoured Swedish EMU membership, and
this reflects the opinion of the vast majority of business owners. Sweden’s three
leading trade union umbrella organisations have now taken a stance in favour of
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Swedish EMU membership. The blue-collar worker’s umbrella organisation LO,
did so only in April 2000.
Among the seven political parties represented in parliament, the Greens and the
Left Party are against Swedish EMU membership (representing almost 20% of
the electorate). The Centre Party and the Christian Democrats are undetermined
(representing over 15% of the electorate), though both lean towards support for
the EMU and the latter more strongly so. The People’s Party and the Moderate
Party are in favour (over 30% together).
Interest was long focused on the ruling Social Democratic Party (with some 35%
support), which was undetermined but could find a parliamentary majority for
either stance. Stefan Hejelid (political scientist at Växjö University) has studied
the Social Democratic decision-making process and concludes that Prime
Minister Göran Persson “is genuinely sceptic to the EMU. But he understands
when it is no longer possible to remain outside. Also he is somewhat attracted
by the influence in Europe that Swedish EMU membership may entail.”19. Mr
Persson delayed a decision on the EMU, in the hope that public opinion would
eventually become more favourable. Finally, the party’s executive board
unanimously declared its support for Swedish EMU membership on 14 January
2000, saying that it would “counter market forces”. The Party’s congress during
10-12 March 2000 proceeded to accept by a two thirds majority a statement in
favour of Swedish membership and that the issue should be settled through a
public referendum. Party leadership would have preferred not being obliged to
hold a referendum, but was forced to accept this by grassroots opinion and EMU
sceptics. A date for the referendum, which under the constitution can only be
advisory, has yet to be settled. It is unlikely that it will be later than the autumn
following the general election in 2002.
Although the majority of the Social Democratic Party now accepts the Euro, a
vigorous minority remains opposed. During the congress the more animated
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speeches were made be Euro sceptics, and after the congress public support for
EMU actually declined. One of the strongholds of EMU resistance is the
women’s movement, which favours a definite “no” to Swedish membership.
Minister of equality Margareta Winberg wrote a debate with the title “With
EMU back to 1920”20. The message is that adopting the Euro would undermine
the position of women to such an extent that they would be worse off than in
1920, when women had not yet acquired the right to vote. Further, several
leaders in the youth organisation SSU published a debate article with the title
“EMU is a risky rightwing project”. The article stated that “throughout the late
20th century we young social democrats have seen the party retreat … EMU is
yet another step backwards, away from the goals of democratic socialism.”21
This reflects the opinion that Sweden’s comprehensive welfare state may be
threatened by European integration.
Interest rate cut on 8 April 1999
For the most part, Swedish financial markets received the lowering of the repo
rate by half a per cent 8 April 1999 positively. The chief economist of the largest
bank Handelsbanken, Jan Häggström, said that “Europe needs more than lower
interest rates, but this is a major step in the right direction.”22 Villy Bergström, a
member of the Governing Board of the central bank, said that the cut was
helpful as “some of Europe’s growth problem is due to low demand”23. Critique
was more against the way in which the interest rate was announced. The concept
of trying to surprise financial markets was seen by some analysts as an outdated
policy. According to this view the ECB should promote openness and
transparency through continuous dialogue with financial markets.
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2. Legal Framework
As a part of the second stage of EMU, the independence of the Swedish central
bank (Riksbanken) was strengthened. The central bank is regulated by Chapter 9
of the constitution and also by a special Riksbank law24. Changes in the
constitution are regulated in Chapter 8 of the Swedish constitution. The basic
requirement is that a bill proposing constitutional change must pass twice in
parliament by simple majority, with a general election in between (note that the
pending constitutional change is not an issue in the election). Since the present
constitution came into effect in 1974 it has been amended after every general
election.
The bill25 proposing change of the constitution was accepted by parliament the
first time 4 March 1998 and the second time 25 November 1998, the latter time
together with changes in the Riksbank law. The changes came into effect 1
January 1999. The opinion of the Swedish government is that it is necessary to
adjust Swedish legislation only when it directly contradicts EU legislation, as
the latter automatically takes precedent over national legislation. Nevertheless it
is considered appropriate that the constitution reflects how the country is in fact
governed. Two difficulties remain: Chapter 9 paragraph 12 which gives the
Swedish central bank authority over monetary policy and paragraph 13 which
gives the central bank the sole authority to issue notes and coins. The
government has said this must be changed before joining the third stage of
EMU, but that it is sufficient that the constitutional change is pending, i.e. not
been accepted by parliament a second time26.
Among the four EU countries outside the Euro zone, Sweden is a unique case: It
lacks the formal opt-out enjoyed by the UK and Denmark, and unlike Greece
managed to fulfil the economic convergence criteria. Ulf Bernitz (Professor of
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European Integration Law at Stockholm University) pointed out in 1995 that
Sweden was formally bound to join the EMU. This appears to be the generally
accepted view today in Sweden. Hence Sweden has granted itself an opt-out –
arguably a bad example for present applicant countries which have not been
given opt-outs.
Nevertheless, in the government bill that laid out the policy of not joining the
third stage in 1999, an attempt to provide a legal base for Sweden’s decision is
presented27. Sweden made a statement when EU membership negotiations
opened on February 1, 1993. That statement was: ”A final Swedish position
relating to the transition from the second stage to the third stage will be taken in
the light of further developments and in accordance with the provisions in the
Treaty”. The bill continues: “It was judged to be more appropriate to make a
unilateral declaration than to try to get the same formal opt-out that Denmark
and the United Kingdom have.”
The government’s position has also been that public opinion is more important
than legal formalities. During April 2000 both Romano Prodi and Anna
Diamantopoulou have made statements in Swedish media to the effect that
regardless of the legal situation, the opinion of the people must be the decisive
factor. It is also important that prior to the 1994 EU membership referendum the
Government repeatedly stated that EMU participation would be decided at a
later stage, after consulting the people. The legalistic argument, although
technically probably correct, is therefore politically dead.
Further, on 1 March 2000 a new law on keeping accounts in Euro entered into
force28. According to this law joint stock and insurance companies may choose
to keep accounts in Euro, and must then also register their share capital in Euro.
The same possibility is open to Swedish subsidiaries of foreign joint stock
companies. The decision to switch to accounting in Euro must be made by the
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shareholders’ meeting, and can be valid from 1 January 2001 at the earliest.
Taxes will still be paid in Swedish kronor, and be based on the annual average
exchange rate between the Swedish currency and the Euro.
UK REPORT
SUMMARY
Robert Kissack*
Each country of the European Union has particular cultural and historical
aspects that set it apart from the others - it is the diversity upon which the EU
thrives.  Britain, in the context of the Euro-Spectator report, however, is in some
respects uniquely different.  It is by far the biggest ‘out’ member of the union, its
GDP approximately three times Denmark, Sweden and Greece together.
Alongside Denmark it has a negotiated opt-out from stage three monetary union
in the Maastrict Treaty and the European Communities Amendment Act of 1993,
however a referendum on membership still lies out of sight on the British
political horizon, postponed into the next parliamentary term or beyond.
Nevertheless, the euro is one of the core issues in the British political debate, as
is EU membership in general.  While only the strongest of euro-sceptics will
openly discuss leaving the EU, the question of how Britain can fully participate
in the EU while it remaining outside the euro persists.
The political landscape is being changed by the euro debate.  Conservatives (on
the right) and New Labour (previously on the left) have swapped their
traditional ‘internationalist’ and ‘nationalist’ political totems.  Winston
Churchill was one of the founding fathers of the Council of Europe and Edward
Heath negotiated British membership into the EEC, yet the leader of the
Conservative Party today, William Hague, is campaigning to ‘Save the Pound’
and has reunited the remains of his party in the aftermath of the landslide victory
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of Tony Blair’s New Labour in 1997 around a euro-sceptic position.  Along the
way he has lost a number of influential Tories from the previous government,
such as Kenneth Clarke and Michael Heseltine who have joined the cross-party
pro-euro campaign group Britain in Europe.  Labour are pro-EU, and lukewarm-
euro.  Prime Minister Blair is aware that public opinion is against the euro,
(roughly 30% of people questioned in opinion polls over the last year would
agree to join the euro if a referendum were to be held), and that improving the
image of the EU would be the fastest way of changing the negative view of the
euro.  His principle aim remains being elected for a second term, and thus
wishes to prevent the euro debate becoming a millstone around his party that
could sink their chances of re-election.
Due to these political dynamics, the euro question is being twisted in the public
arena.  It is the Conservatives’ olive branch - a peace-offering to dissidents,
while being New Labour’s hot-potato - an issue they are afraid to grasp firmly.
Consequently, protagonists of the debate are grouping around two
distinguishable positions, which are presented in the report as ‘national-
sovereign’ verses ‘economic determinist’.  Euro-sceptics rally assertively around
a nationalist sentiments, patriotically calling for the defence of British identity
against the gradual tide of EU regulation and the erosion of sovereignty.  The
pro-euro camp, spearheaded by Britain in Europe, have argued persistently that
the debate over joining the euro is convincingly won through a lesson in market
economics.  The Labour government take this attitude too, hoping to defuse their
opponents claims of their ‘un-patriotic’ behaviour through the counter-claim that
they are guided by rationality and reason instead of emotional rhetoric.
1. Political Aspects
Much of the political analysis of the report substantiates the position outlined
above.  Specific issues raised include the nature of press reporting on the EU
within Britain, where the angle taken is usually critical or neutral, but rarely
positive.  It is suggested that the euro debate is an example of the growing
tendency in mature democracies to move towards single-issue lobbying, after
the decline of grand political ideologies.  This interpretation is in part founded
on the June 1999 EP elections, where the Conservatives won the most seats,
campaigning on an ‘anti-Europe’ line (38%), while turn-out was a pitiful 25%.
The report does comment extensively on an article entitled Alice in Euroland by
Professor Buiter of Cambridge University.   Professor Buiter sat on the
Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England and compares their practise
of publishing the minutes of their meetings with that of the European Central
Bank, where no such practise occurs.  He questions the link between
transparency and democracy and asks whether transparency will strengthen or
weaken a political union comprising of a single economic area.  He concludes
that in times of prosperity secrecy will be tolerated, but in times of economic
hardship he believes transparency will prove to be a more malleable and
ultimately durable procedure.  Whether one agrees with Professor Buiter or not,
his inclusion in the report was designed to illustrate how sensible, informed and
above all, balanced judgements on the euro question are to be found on the
periphery of public debate.
2. Legal Aspects
The legal aspects of the report form a smaller section that in other reports due to
the limited nature of the legislation passed in Britain to date concerning the euro.
The report details the procedure through which Britain will apply to join the
euro after it has held a successful referendum, and the procedure by which
ECOFIN, the Commission and ultimately the Council of Ministers will accept or
decline Britain’s application.
3. Economic Aspects
In contrast to the previous section, Britain’s absence from the euro currency
provides a lot of material of the economic analysis.  As was symptomatic in the
political debate, many of the key economic issues discussed have radically
different interpretations by pro- and anti- euro commentators.  One of the few
areas in which there is agreement is the cyclic divergence between the British
and other EU economies.  This can be traced back to the time of sterling’s exit
from the Exchange Rate Mechanism and the 30% devaluation of sterling against
the Deutschmark.  Since 1992, the UK economy has recovered well, driven
initially by export lead growth attributable to the weak pound.  Today the euro
and the pound are under the control of their respective independent central banks
who are both under obligation to set interest rates in accordance to maintaining
inflation rates between 2-3%  Yet the British economy has the lowest
unemployment rate in 20 years and is still forecast to grow by 2.75% this year,
(figures taken from Chancellor Gordon Brown’s budget speech, 22 March
2000).  Hence the interest rate in the UK has remained about 3% higher than the
rate set by the ECB.  Interest rate convergence is a key indicator in determining
economic convergence and remains a long way off.
Further issues considered in the report include the ideal exchange rate for
sterling’s entry into the euro-zone, and the likelihood of entry taking place at the
level desired by most British industries.  Labour market flexibility and Foreign
Direct Investment are also key issues which some think set the British economy
apart from that of the euro-11.  The impact of the euro on the financial markets
in the City of London is also discussed.
The report ends by asking why Britain sees itself outside the euro zone, and
looks briefly at the influence the United States of America has over it, the
portrayal of fraternal ties between the two countries and the credibility of such
sentiments.  It ends by suggesting that Britain will only embrace the euro when
it has learnt to embrace Europe; to see its place among the European Union as
the rightful one and not as a wooden spoon for being cast out of the international
limelight it once enjoyed.
